The LINK Price Has Dropped by More Than Half from Its Peak, But Someone Quietly Accumulated 100 Million Coins During the "10/11 Crash"

By: blockbeats|2026/01/29 23:00:00
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Original Article Title: Somebody Bought 10% of the LINK Supply—and Nobody Knows Who
Original Article Author: @LinkBoi777, Crypto Trader
Original Article Translation: AididiaoJP, Foresight News

Based on in-depth on-chain data analysis, when researching the wallets holding the top 100 LINK amounts, I discovered an unusual pattern.

Multiple wallets hold nearly identical amounts of LINK, each around 2 million tokens, and do not hold any other assets. Initially identifying 8 to 9 similar wallets, further investigation revealed that these were just the tip of the iceberg.

Eventually, I found a total of 48 wallets with almost the same LINK balance, exhibiting highly consistent transaction patterns. Based on this consistency, I believe they belong to the same entity.

In other words, during the period from August 2025 to January 2026, an entity accumulated approximately 100 million LINK, representing 10% of its total supply.

Clearly, this entity has made significant efforts to remain obscure. Its accumulation strategy has been carefully crafted to avoid drawing attention or impacting the market price.

Why do I believe these wallets belong to the same entity?

There are several key pieces of evidence supporting this:

· Each wallet holds around 2 million LINK.

· All wallets were created between August and November 2025.

· All purchases originated from the same Coinbase hot wallet address: 0xA9D1e08C7793af67e9d92fe308d5697FB81d3E43.

The most compelling evidence is the comparison of transaction heatmaps. These wallets' heatmaps are remarkably similar, executing similar amounts of LINK transactions on the same dates, following the same accumulation rhythm.

There are slight timing differences: wallets created later had larger initial buy-ins, while those created earlier were more gradual. However, after the initial phase, all wallets began to make consistent monthly purchases on the same date each month.

For example, observing wallets 54, 55, 56, August data may vary slightly, but their transaction behaviors from September to January are nearly synchronized. This pattern repeats across all 48 wallets, as if following the same schedule.

The LINK Price Has Dropped by More Than Half from Its Peak, But Someone Quietly Accumulated 100 Million Coins During the

The link showcases these 48 wallets and their transaction heatmaps for readers to verify themselves

Why Did the Market Show No Reaction to the Accumulation of 10% of the Supply?

The answer is simple: the entity made a concerted effort to avoid disrupting the market.

They used anonymous wallets not associated with any public entity and structured their purchases in batches to avoid sudden spikes in demand. The goal was clear: discreetly accumulate LINK without triggering market FOMO or speculation.

To achieve this, they took advantage of a rare market event.

The Market Crash on October 10th

According to Raoul Pal, at that time, market makers could not access the API, leading to a severe imbalance in the crypto market. Simultaneously, tariff concerns sparked panic selling, flooding the order book with sell orders. Due to a lack of buyers stepping in, the market saw a freefall drop.

To prevent a total collapse, exchanges were forced to intervene, placing a large number of buy orders to absorb the selling pressure, thus accumulating a significant amount of crypto assets in inventory.

In the weeks following the crash, these assets were gradually released back into the market in October and November, creating sustained selling pressure and unusually high liquidity.

This presented an excellent opportunity for discreet accumulation.

The entities behind these wallets leveraged the liquidity window to acquire a large amount of LINK while avoiding driving up the price. It is noteworthy that 39 of the 48 wallets were created in the peak liquidity months of October and November.

Two Possible Motivations

One is opportunistic accelerated accumulation. The entity saw the market crash as a rare opportunity to speed up the accumulation process, which otherwise might have taken several more months.

Second is emergency strategic reserves. The entity may have urgently needed to acquire LINK and used the liquidity from the crash to quietly build its position to avoid price fluctuations. Whether this urgency stems from strategic demand or external pressure is currently unclear.

Impact on Exchange Balances

The influx of new wallets coincides precisely with the sharp decline in exchange LINK balances from October to November, as indicated by CryptoQuant data.

This drop aligns perfectly with the creation of the 39 new wallets, each accumulating around 2 million LINK during this period.

Who Could the Mastermind Be?

Having accumulated 10% of the LINK token supply, the potential suspects have been significantly narrowed down.

Chainlink Labs

Likelihood is low. Chainlink's official non-circulating supply of around 300 million LINK is publicly disclosed and accounted for in their roadmap. Additionally, Chainlink has publicly announced a weekly buyback of $1 million worth of LINK, making it contradictory to secretly hoard nearly $1 billion worth of LINK.

However, the timing is worth noting: the accumulation started on August 11, 2025, just 4 days after the Chainlink reserve mechanism was revealed, which could signal long-term confidence to the public.

BlackRock

This is one of the more reasonable speculations. With assets under management totaling $14 trillion, BlackRock has repeatedly stated that tokenization is the future of the financial market. Their $3+ billion BUIDL Fund heavily relies on Chainlink's CCIP, reserve proof, and data services.

Owning 100 million LINK would help them strategically position themselves in the tokenization infrastructure. This allocation is significant given their size. A secret accumulation would also make sense, as a large public purchase would inevitably drive up the price significantly.

JPMorgan

Equally plausible. This trillion-dollar asset bank is rapidly expanding its blockchain division (Kinexys, formerly Onyx) and has become one of the most active traditional institutions in tokenized assets and cross-chain finance.

Their tokenized currency markets, fund flow projects, and multiple public chain settlements in 2025 all rely on Chainlink's CCIP, runtime environments, and oracle data feeds. Holding 100 million LINK would help them establish a strategic position in their interoperable and oracle infrastructure between their permissioned and public chains, ensuring priority access, staking rewards, and reducing reliance risks.

Interestingly, JPMorgan's actions around the significant drop on October 10th are intriguing. Just days before the drop, the bank released a bearish report highlighting the vulnerability of crypto-related stocks to geopolitical risks. Although the drop was primarily triggered by external factors, the bearish report followed by a liquidity vacuum raises speculation that large institutions may have opportunistically accumulated positions quietly.

Financial Infrastructure Institutions (such as DTCC, SWIFT)

Unlikely. These types of institutions typically do not hold strategic token reserves. More importantly, if Chainlink were to become part of their future core infrastructure, DTCC or SWIFT would be unlikely to tolerate an unknown entity controlling 10% of the LINK supply — this would introduce unacceptable systemic risk.

One more detail worth noting:

All 48 wallets were created between August and November 2025, with the final one being established on November 20 — just two days after SWIFT activated the new ISO 20022 standard, with Chainlink being a participant in that project.

While the timing coincidence does not constitute causal evidence, it is hard to ignore. If LINK is to play a significant role in future financial communication, settlement, or interoperability facilities, establishing a strategic reserve ahead of time is undoubtedly a reasonable long-term strategy.

For institutions aiming for long-term integration rather than short-term speculation, locking in the token supply in advance can reduce execution risk, mitigate price impact, and lessen reliance on post-market liquidity.

High Net Worth Individuals

Highly unlikely. 100 million LINK worth over $1 billion would require a rare individual with that level of funds, and concentrating them into a single cryptocurrency asset without a clear strategic purpose is even more rare.

My Take

I believe this is almost certainly the work of a large institution. Without deep market awareness and institutional-level execution capabilities, it is impossible to accumulate 10% of the supply without significantly impacting the price.

The increased buying during the liquidity surplus period after the October 10th crash, especially, points to institutional behavior. They understand that high liquidity allows for frequent buying without spiking the price. This level of coordination far exceeds the capabilities of the average individual investor.

Also worth noting is that the accumulated amount happens to be exactly 100 million LINK, precisely one-tenth of the total supply. This indicates that its scale is purposefully set, not randomly accumulated, reflecting a long-term strategic intent for the project.

Accumulating 100 million LINK is unlikely to be solely for speculative purposes. This suggests that the token may have practical use cases in the future. This entity seems to be preparing to support the future of Chainlink in underpinning critical financial infrastructure and is building reserves accordingly.

Uncertainty remains until the identity is revealed. However, a single entity may have accumulated 10% of the LINK supply for future use, a fact that is significantly bullish in itself.

What's Next?

If the buyer is a large institution, the subsequent impact could be very positive. Other asset management companies and infrastructure providers may rush to build their own LINK reserves, but replicating this slow, secretive accumulation process is nearly impossible. Latecomers may be forced to buy at a high price, thus significantly driving up the price.

At the same time, concentration risk cannot be ignored. Controlling 10% of the supply implies enormous influence, and in the absence of clarity on this entity's intent, its future moves remain a key variable.

The following points are clear:

· This accumulation is indeed real.

· Its strategy is highly sophisticated.

· It involves an unusually large scale.

Whether this is an early move by a large institution or another scenario, this is one of the most noteworthy on-chain patterns in LINK's history.

Original Article Link

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China's Central Bank and Eight Other Departments' Latest Regulatory Focus: Key Attention to RWA Tokenized Asset Risk


Foreword: Today, the People's Bank of China's website published the "Notice of the People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for Market Regulation, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Preventing and Dealing with Risks Related to Virtual Currency and Others (Yinfa [2026] No. 42)", the latest regulatory requirements from the eight departments including the central bank, which are basically consistent with the regulatory requirements of recent years. The main focus of the regulation is on speculative activities such as virtual currency trading, exchanges, ICOs, overseas platform services, and this time, regulatory oversight of RWA has been added, explicitly prohibiting RWA tokenization, stablecoins (especially those pegged to the RMB). The following is the full text:


To the people's governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:


  Recently, there have been speculative activities related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets (RWA) tokenization, disrupting the economic and financial order and jeopardizing the property security of the people. In order to further prevent and address the risks related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets tokenization, effectively safeguard national security and social stability, in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks," "Securities Law of the People's Republic of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Futures and Derivatives," "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Renminbi," "Regulations on Prevention and Disposal of Illegal Fundraising," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration," "Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China," and other provisions, after reaching consensus with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and with the approval of the State Council, the relevant matters are notified as follows:


  I. Clarify the essential attributes of virtual currency, Real-World Assets tokenization, and related business activities


  (I) Virtual currency does not possess the legal status equivalent to fiat currency. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, Tether, etc., have the main characteristics of being issued by non-monetary authorities, using encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technology, existing in digital form, etc. They do not have legal tender status, should not and cannot be circulated and used as currency in the market.


  The business activities related to virtual currency are classified as illegal financial activities. The exchange of fiat currency and virtual currency within the territory, exchange of virtual currencies, acting as a central counterparty in buying and selling virtual currencies, providing information intermediary and pricing services for virtual currency transactions, token issuance financing, and trading of virtual currency-related financial products, etc., fall under illegal financial activities, such as suspected illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public issuance of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, etc., are strictly prohibited across the board and resolutely banned in accordance with the law. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to provide virtual currency-related services to domestic entities in any form.


  A stablecoin pegged to a fiat currency indirectly fulfills some functions of the fiat currency in circulation. Without the consent of relevant authorities in accordance with the law and regulations, any domestic or foreign entity or individual is not allowed to issue a RMB-pegged stablecoin overseas.


(II)Tokenization of Real-World Assets refers to the use of encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technologies to transform ownership rights, income rights, etc., of assets into tokens (tokens) or other interests or bond certificates with token (token) characteristics, and carry out issuance and trading activities.


  Engaging in the tokenization of real-world assets domestically, as well as providing related intermediary, information technology services, etc., which are suspected of illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public offering of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities carried out with the approval of the competent authorities in accordance with the law and regulations and relying on specific financial infrastructures. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to illegally provide services related to the tokenization of real-world assets to domestic entities in any form.


  II. Sound Work Mechanism


  (III) Inter-agency Coordination. The People's Bank of China, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of virtual currency-related illegal financial activities.


  The China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of illegal financial activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets.


  (IV) Strengthening Local Implementation. The people's governments at the provincial level are overall responsible for the prevention and disposal of risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets in their respective administrative regions. The specific leading department is the local financial regulatory department, with participation from branches and dispatched institutions of the State Council's financial regulatory department, telecommunications regulators, public security, market supervision, and other departments, in coordination with cyberspace departments, courts, and procuratorates, to improve the normalization of the work mechanism, effectively connect with the relevant work mechanisms of central departments, form a cooperative and coordinated working pattern between central and local governments, effectively prevent and properly handle risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets, and maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  III. Strengthened Risk Monitoring, Prevention, and Disposal


  (5) Enhanced Risk Monitoring. The People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Cyberspace Administration of China, and other departments continue to improve monitoring techniques and system support, enhance cross-departmental data analysis and sharing, establish sound information sharing and cross-validation mechanisms, promptly grasp the risk situation of activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization. Local governments at all levels give full play to the role of local monitoring and early warning mechanisms. Local financial regulatory authorities, together with branches and agencies of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, as well as departments of cyberspace and public security, ensure effective connection between online monitoring, offline investigation, and fund tracking, efficiently and accurately identify activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly share risk information, improve early warning information dissemination, verification, and rapid response mechanisms.


  (6) Strengthened Oversight of Financial Institutions, Intermediaries, and Technology Service Providers. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing account opening, fund transfer, and clearing services for virtual currency-related business activities, issuing and selling financial products related to virtual currency, including virtual currency and related financial products in the scope of collateral, conducting insurance business related to virtual currency, or including virtual currency in the scope of insurance liability. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing custody, clearing, and settlement services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related business and related financial products. Relevant intermediary institutions and information technology service providers are prohibited from providing intermediary, technical, or other services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related businesses and related financial products.


  (7) Enhanced Management of Internet Information Content and Access. Internet enterprises are prohibited from providing online business venues, commercial displays, marketing, advertising, or paid traffic diversion services for virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities. Upon discovering clues of illegal activities, they should promptly report to relevant departments and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and inquiries. Based on the clues transferred by the financial regulatory authorities, the cyberspace administration, telecommunications authorities, and public security departments should promptly close and deal with websites, mobile applications (including mini-programs), and public accounts engaged in virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities in accordance with the law.


  (8) Strengthened Entity Registration and Advertisement Management. Market supervision departments strengthen entity registration and management, and enterprise and individual business registrations must not contain terms such as "virtual currency," "virtual asset," "cryptocurrency," "crypto asset," "stablecoin," "real-world asset tokenization," or "RWA" in their names or business scopes. Market supervision departments, together with financial regulatory authorities, legally enhance the supervision of advertisements related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly investigating and handling relevant illegal advertisements.


  (IX) Continued Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities. The National Development and Reform Commission, together with relevant departments, strictly controls virtual currency mining activities, continuously promotes the rectification of virtual currency mining activities. The people's governments of various provinces take overall responsibility for the rectification of "mining" within their respective administrative regions. In accordance with the requirements of the National Development and Reform Commission and other departments in the "Notice on the Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities" (NDRC Energy-saving Building [2021] No. 1283) and the provisions of the "Guidance Catalog for Industrial Structure Adjustment (2024 Edition)," a comprehensive review, investigation, and closure of existing virtual currency mining projects are conducted, new mining projects are strictly prohibited, and mining machine production enterprises are strictly prohibited from providing mining machine sales and other services within the country.


  (X) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal Financial Activities. Upon discovering clues to illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets, local financial regulatory authorities, branches of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, and other relevant departments promptly investigate, determine, and properly handle the issues in accordance with the law, and seriously hold the relevant entities and individuals legally responsible. Those suspected of crimes are transferred to the judicial authorities for processing according to the law.


 (XI) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal and Criminal Activities. The Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, as well as judicial and procuratorial organs, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, rigorously crack down on illegal and criminal activities related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, such as fraud, money laundering, illegal business operations, pyramid schemes, illegal fundraising, and other illegal and criminal activities carried out under the guise of virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, etc.


  (XII) Strengthen Industry Self-discipline. Relevant industry associations should enhance membership management and policy advocacy, based on their own responsibilities, advocate and urge member units to resist illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets. Member units that violate regulatory policies and industry self-discipline rules are to be disciplined in accordance with relevant self-regulatory management regulations. By leveraging various industry infrastructure, conduct risk monitoring related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, and promptly transfer issue clues to relevant departments.


  IV. Strict Supervision of Domestic Entities Engaging in Overseas Business Activities


(XIII) Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with the law and regulations, domestic entities and foreign entities controlled by them may not issue virtual currency overseas.


  (XIV) Domestic entities engaging directly or indirectly in overseas external debt-based tokenization of real-world assets, or conducting asset securitization activities abroad based on domestic ownership rights, income rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as domestic equity), should be strictly regulated in accordance with the principles of "same business, same risk, same rules." The National Development and Reform Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other relevant departments regulate it according to their respective responsibilities. For other forms of overseas real-world asset tokenization activities based on domestic equity by domestic entities, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with relevant departments, supervise according to their division of responsibilities. Without the consent and filing of relevant departments, no unit or individual may engage in the above-mentioned business.


  (15) Overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing Real World Asset Tokenization-related services overseas shall do so legally and prudently. They shall have professional personnel and systems in place to effectively mitigate business risks, strictly implement customer onboarding, suitability management, anti-money laundering requirements, and incorporate them into the domestic financial institutions' compliance and risk management system. Intermediaries and information technology service providers offering Real World Asset Tokenization services abroad based on domestic equity or conducting Real World Asset Tokenization business in the form of overseas debt for domestic entities directly or indirectly venturing abroad must strictly comply with relevant laws and regulations. They should establish and improve relevant compliance and internal control systems in accordance with relevant normative requirements, strengthen business and risk control, and report the business developments to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval or filing.


  V. Strengthen Organizational Implementation


  (16) Strengthen organizational leadership and overall coordination. All departments and regions should attach great importance to the prevention of risks related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization, strengthen organizational leadership, clarify work responsibilities, form a long-term effective working mechanism with centralized coordination, local implementation, and shared responsibilities, maintain high pressure, dynamically monitor risks, effectively prevent and mitigate risks in an orderly and efficient manner, legally protect the property security of the people, and make every effort to maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  (17) Widely carry out publicity and education. All departments, regions, and industry associations should make full use of various media and other communication channels to disseminate information through legal and policy interpretation, analysis of typical cases, and education on investment risks, etc. They should promote the illegality and harm of virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses and their manifestations, fully alert to potential risks and hidden dangers, and enhance public awareness and identification capabilities for risk prevention.


  VI. Legal Responsibility


  (18) Engaging in illegal financial activities related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization in violation of this notice, as well as providing services for virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses, shall be punished in accordance with relevant regulations. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law. For domestic entities and individuals who knowingly or should have known that overseas entities illegally provided virtual currency or Real World Asset Tokenization-related services to domestic entities and still assisted them, relevant responsibilities shall be pursued according to the law. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law.


  (19) If any unit or individual invests in virtual currencies, Real World Asset Tokens, and related financial products against public order and good customs, the relevant civil legal actions shall be invalid, and any resulting losses shall be borne by them. If there are suspicions of disrupting financial order and jeopardizing financial security, the relevant departments shall deal with them according to the law.


  This notice shall enter into force upon the date of its issuance. The People's Bank of China and ten other departments' "Notice on Further Preventing and Dealing with the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation" (Yinfa [2021] No. 237) is hereby repealed.


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